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The Smug Assumption of Reverse Discrimination:
Abigail Fisher and Fisherv. Universityof Texas atAustin
R. Nicholas Rabold
-Thus itis not enoughjust to open the gates ofopportunity.
4
All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.
ABSTRACT

Many expected Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013)-anappealfrom the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuitupholding
the University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissionsprogram-to sound
the death knell for race-based affirmative action in higher education. Instead, in
remanding the case back to -the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the consideration of race in college admissionprograms, so long as
such use could satisifr strict scrutiny. Nonetheless, Fisher I concerned academics
andpractitionerswith its potentially limiting language, leaving the future of racebased aftirmativeactionprograms uncertain. When the fifh Circuit gain held the
University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions program was
constitutional, the Fisher found its way back to the Supreme Court.
Oral arguments for Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S.
Ct. 2198 (2016) revived concern for the abolition of race-basedaffirmative action
policies in the United States. In ruling, however, the Supreme Court again upheld
the constitutionalityofrace-basedaffirative actionprogramsin highereducation,
this time also explicitly approving of the program used by the University of Texas
at Austin. Although the decision was hailed as a great victory for proponents of
affirmative action-and it was-this Note argues Fisher II's admittedly great
precedentialvalue is weakened by the case's failure to confront certain legal fictions
enveloping the law ofaffrmative action. Specifcally, this Note aigues itis time for
the Court to disregard false equivalences between positive and negative racial
preferences, recognize the problems associated with the generalized grievances
alleged by opponents of affirmative action, and permit universities even greater
discretion to explicitly consider flexible racialquotas in their admnissionprograms.
I Editor-in-Chief, KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL; J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Kentucky
College of Law. The author would like to dedicate this piece to all victims of injustice, institutional and
otherwise. Special thanks goes to the author's parents, for their unwavering, absolute love and support.
To the Editors of the KENTUCKY LAWJoURNAL for their tireless work. To the Faculty and Staff of the
University of Kentucky College of Law for a fabulous legal education. And to the author's best friend,
George Edward "Trip" Carpenter III, for his enduring friendship and affection. It sure is pretty!
' Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Commencement Address at Howard University: To
at
available
(transcript
1965)
4,
(June
Rights
These
Fulfill
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/fpid=27021 [https*//perma.cc/9HTX-JN9S]).
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INTRODUCTION

Fisherv. University of Texas at Austin grew out of an appeal from a ruling of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that upheld the University
of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions program.3 At the Supreme Court,
the Fifth Circuit's ruling in FisherIwas challenged on two general bases. First, the
petitioner challenged the ruling on the basis that the University of Texas at
Austin's use of affirmative action was prima facie unconstitutional.4 Second, on the
basis that the Fifth Circuit had improperly applied Grutter v. Bolinger' In ruling,
the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Fifth Circuit, refusing to take a
position on whether the University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions
program was unconstitutional.6 Rather, the Court remanded the case back to the
Fifth Circuit, ordering that court to reevaluate its decision properly under Grutter
v. Bolingerand Regents of the University of Califonia v. Bakke.7 In so ruling, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of race-conscious admission programs

2 For purposes of this Note, the author refers to the 2013 Supreme Court opinion as Fisher I; the
author refers to the 2016 Supreme Court opinion as TisherlL
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2011).
Brief for Petitioner at 18-22, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher1), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345), at *18-22. Petitioner specifically argued the University of Texas at Austin used its raceconscious admissions program for purposes of racial balancing, which is unconstitutional under Grutter
v. Bofinger, petitioner also attacked the race conscious admissions program as not based on a
compelling governmental interest and as being overly broad. Furthermore, petitioner argued the
University of Texas at Austin was improperly applying critical mass theory, and that the University's
asserted interest in classroom diversity also is not a compelling interest:

The proper base for measuring "critical mass" is the "student body," not the
classroom. As noted above, the point of Grutter was to permit universities to
create a "critical mass" of minority students on the campus to foster exchange of
ideas and experiences. But Grutter nowhere suggests that every classroom must
have a "critical mass" of minority students.
Id. at *19 (citation omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)). Although
Justice Kennedy did not point this out in his opinion, there is a logical flaw here. It is true that a critical
mass of diverse students in one classroom will not necessarily correlate with a critical mass of diverse
students at an entire university. But it is also true that a critical mass of diverse students in allclassrooms
will correlate with a critical mass of diverse students at a university. Therefore, it seems perfectly
reasonable to rely on classroom diversity-broadly speaking-as an indicium of campus-wide diversity.
Further, the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body will of course manifest
themselves most clearly in classrooms, where students interact with each other for purposes of education
and thought.
s Id. at 23-24; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Fisher
argued "even if UT were entitled to more deference than Grutter suggests, the Fifth Circuit erred by
'distortfing] narrow tailoring into a rote exercise in judicial deference.'" Brief for Petitioner, supra note
4, at 23 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, J.,
dissenting)).
6 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421-22 (2013).
' See id. at 2417-19; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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in the context of higher education, but the Court also emphasized the
constitutional limitations of such a program.'
Scholarly commentary immediately following the release of the ruling in Fisher
I was critical. Academics expressed concern for the potential new limitations on
affirmative action.' Some scholars argued subtle differences in the language of
Fisher k-when compared with its precursors-could make affirmative action
programs more difficult to structure and implement.o These concerns, however,
may have been temporarily assuaged by the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on remand,
where the University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions program was
again upheld.' In reapplying Bakke and Grutter, the Fifth Circuit found the
University of Texas at Austin's race-conscious admissions program was
constitutionally sound: "We are satisfied that UT Austin has demonstrated that
race-conscious holistic review is necessary to make the Top Ten Percent Plan
workable by patching the holes that a mechanical admissions program leaves in its
ability to achieve the rich diversity that contributes to its academic mission."12
But it was not over at the Fifth Circuit. After being denied a rehearing en
banc,"3 the case was again appealed to the Supreme Court. And, again, certiorari
was granted. FisherII was argued before the Court on December 9, 2015;4 the
opinion was released six months later-following the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia' 5-on June 23, 2016.16 Yet again, the Supreme Court upheld race-conscious
8 See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421-22. A race-conscious admissions program must meet strict
scrutiny to be constitutional. This requires such a program to be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest:
In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a university must make a showing
that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the only interest that this Court has
approved in this context: the benefits of a student body diversity that
encompasses a . . . broa[d] array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element."
Id. at 2421 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). This standard imposes significant limitations on the
manner in which such a program may be expressed, as this Note shall discuss later.
9 See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
AND THE LAW (Vintage Books 2015) (2013); Scott Warner, Pete Land, & Kendra Berner, The US.
Supreme Court'sDecision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: What It Tells Us (and Doesn't
Tell Us) About the Consideration ofRace in College and UniversityAdmissions and Other Contexts,

FED. LAW., Aug. 2013, at 48,54-55 (discussing the implications of Fisher]).
"o See, eg.,

Richard Sander &

Aaron Danielson,

Thinking Hard About

Race-Neutral"

Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967, 967 (2014).
n Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 657. The University of Texas at Austin's Top Ten Percent Plan, along with the details of
its race-conscious admissions program, are discussed in Section IA.
1

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 771 F.3d 274,275 (5th Cir. 2014).

SFisher v. University of Texas at Austin, SCOTUSBLOG,

files/cases/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin-2/

http://www.scotusblog.com/case[https://perma.cc/YXW8-X7AV] (last visited Mar.

20, 2017).
"s Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia,justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0

[https://perma.cc/5VEE-JYVP].
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admissions programs-affirmative action in the context of higher education-as
constitutional.
Clarifying the rules meant to be extracted from FisherIwhilst reaffirming the
findamental principles of Bakke and Grutter, Fisher II provides hope for the
future of affirmative action in higher education. Indeed, the ruling was a great
success for proponents of affirmative action. But did the Court go far enough? The
Supreme Court never resolved the matter of Abigail Fisher's lack of standing,
failing to mention the issue in either of the Court's majority opinions." More
important for purposes of this Note, however, the Supreme Court failed to directly
address the root claim of Abigail Fisher's challenge: that racial distinctions-no
matter their purpose-are necessarily invidious, permitting the preservation of the
legal fictions of "false equivalences" and "false standing" in the law of raceconscious affirmative action.' 8
It is the purpose of this Note to address Fisher's root claim and its troubling
repercussions. Part I details the facts and legal history of the Fishercases, providing
a brief overview of the legal impacts of the two decisions. Part II outlines the
complex sociopolitical origins of race-based affirmative action in American law.
Part III repudiates the three primary arguments offered against race-based
affirmative action: colorblind constitutionalism, the merit and mismatch objections,
and the stigma of objection. Part IV discusses the constitutional law surrounding
modern affirmative action-and points out the legal fictions that envelop it. All of
this will be followed by Part V, an analysis of FisherII and its implications for the
future of affirmative action in the context of higher education.

6

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherB), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).

0 Fisher, 758 F.3d at 640. The Fisherl1 Court made a sly reference to the issue, stating "this case
has been litigated on a somewhat artificial basis." FisherII, 136 S. Ct. at 2209.
1 There has been some debate on this assertion, but-because this Note is so timely-scholarly
commentary on FisherH remains limited. Regardless, many do take the position that Fisher's legal
challenges were intended to attack racial distinctions more broadly. See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones,
What Abigail Fisher's Affirmative Action Case Was Really About,
PROPUBLICA,
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblind-constitution-what-abigail-fishers-affirmative-actioncase-is-r [https*//perma.cc/YE94-LA4X] (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
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I. FISHERI GROUNDLESS CHALLENGES

A. Facts of the Case
Abigail Fisher ("Fisher"), a Texas resident and white woman," was denied
admission to the University of Texas at Austin ("the University") in 2008. She
sued, claiming the University's race-conscious admissions program violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The University uses a
Top Ten Percent Plan to aid in determining admission, 21 which "grants automatic
admission to any public state college, including the University, to all students in the
top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas that comply with certain
standards."D Admittees through the Top Ten Percent Plan took eighty-one
percent of the available seats in 2 00 8 .3 Fisher, however, did not graduate in the top
ten percent of her dass. 24 As such, she was not automatically granted admission. 2 5
Instead, Fisher's application was considered under the University's "holistic review
program, which looks past class rank to evaluate each applicant as an individual
based on his or her achievements and experiences."' Fisher "so became one of
17,131 applicants for the remaining 1,216 seats for Texas residents."' Race is one
among many factors considered as a part of the holistic review process."

19 From the outset, it should be noted that Fisher is not objecting to the consideration of sex in
college admission. See generalyBrief for Petitioner, supra note 4. As a white woman, it is possible that
Fisher herself favors the use of sex-based affirmative action programs. Or, perhaps, Fisher and her
counsel simply deny the distinct challenges that arise at the intersections of discrimination on the bases
of race and sex, and the way in which such discrimination may be applied with virulent strength against
women of color. See, e.g., Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionalityand Positionalty- Situating Women of
Color in the Afilrmative Action Dialogue,9 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1997) (discussing the
intersectionality of discrimination on the bases of race and sex as applied to women of color). This
reveals a fundamental flaw in Fisher's argument, to be discussed later in this Note: that Fisher only
objects to affirmative action programs where she perceives disadvantage as applied to her, a white
woman.
20
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (fl-sherJ), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
21
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009).
2 Eisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. As of mid-2016, "up to 75 percent of the places in the freshman
class [of the University] are filled through the Plan." Tisher H, 136 S. Ct. at 2206. "As a practical
matter," because admittees of the Top Ten Percent Plan are now limited to a statutory cap of seventyfive percent of total admittees, "a student actually needs to finish in the top seven or eight percent of his
or her class in order to be admitted under this category." Id.
' Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).
24 Id.

2
26

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Id. (footnotes omitted).
2
81d.at638.
2

2016-2o'7
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B. Fisher I at the Fifth Circuitand Supreme Court
Under current law, a race-conscious admissions program in the context of
higher education may not be established to redress past discrimination? This is so
because, allegedly, "a university's broad mission [of] education is incompatible with
making the judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
30
statutory violations necessary to justify remedial racial classification." Rather, the
alone."' As a
race
attainment of diversity in higher education "serves values beyond
32
a university
of
mission
.special concern of the First Amendment," the academic
ought to be to provide an "atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment, and creation."3 3 A diverse student body in higher education not only
helps to achieve these goals, but also ensures "enhanced classroom dialogue and the
lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes."" Thus, a compelling governmental
interest exists for the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body"
in the context of higher education.3 1 So long as a university may demonstrate
through its experience and expertise that "a diverse student body would serve its
educational goals," the motivations behind a race-conscious admissions policy are.
36
accorded deference.
But '[s]trict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school's assertion that
its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close
37
analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice." Thus, despite the
deference accorded to a university's "educational judgment that . . . diversity is
38
essential to its educational mission," race-conscious admissions policies-like all
39
"[W]hen
other racial classifications-must satisfy courts' strict scrutiny.
he is
background,
or
ethnic
race
government decisions 'touch upon an individual's

" Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisherl), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
* Id. (internal quotations omitted). This statement of law is deeply ironic. It presumes institutions
of the highest level of scholarship, many of which are host to the academics who helped train current
and past members of the Supreme Court and Federal Legislature, are incapable of understanding and
proposing solutions to redress discriminatory wrongs. Thus, the scholars that are inept to make such
evaluations on their own are the same scholars on whom Congress would call to explain the need for
such remedial measures as affirmative action. Experts are suited to theorize, but only amateurs are suited
to act.
Id. at 2418.
32 Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment)).
3 Id. at 2417. But apparently, no such compelling governmental interest flows from remedying
discrimination itself. Id.
6
1 d. at 2419.
3 Id. at 2421.
3 Id. at 2419 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
3 Id. at 2419-21.
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entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis
is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."'0
"Race may not be considered unless the admissions process can withstand strict
scrutiny."4 ' To survive strict scrutiny, "[t]he University must prove that the means
chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.4 2 "On
this point, the University receives no deference." 4' Each applicant must be
"evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application."" Further, the reviewing
court must verify that it is necessary for the university to use race to achieve
diversity. Although "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative,"4 5 strict scrutiny does require a court to
examine with care, and not defer to, a university's "serious, good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives."6 The burden lies on a university to
demonstrate, "before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable raceneutral alternatives do not suffice."47
The Fifth Circuit, attempting to apply these rules as expressed by the Supreme
Court in FisherI, held the University's race-conscious admissions program satisfied
strict scrutiny: "The admissions procedures that UT adopted, modeled after the
plan approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter, are narrowly tailored .... We are
satisfied that the University's decision to reintroduce race-conscious admissions was
adequately supported by the 'serious, good faith consideration' required by
Grutter."4 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court-applying the aforementioned
rules to the facts of FisherI--determined the Fifth Circuit misstepped.49 The Fifth
Circuit failed to apply the proper analysis.so The "Court of Appeals confined the
strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University's good
faith in its use of racial classifications." 5' The Fifth Circuit's opinion, therefore, was
invalid. The case was remanded back to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration: "The
`0-Id. at 2417 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)). As this Note
will later discuss, strict scrutiny can result in a failure to identify certain positive and negative
distinctions in racial classifications. There is, for instance, a distinction between a racial classification
that seeks to remedy a discriminatory wrong and a racial classification that seeks to inflict a
discriminatory wrong.
4 Id. at 2418.
42 Id. at 2420.
'

Id.

Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003)).
45 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003). For a thoughtful study on race neutral
alternatives and Universities' attempted use of such race neutral admissions programs, see Richard
Sander & Aaron Danielson, Thinking Hard About 'Race-Neuta"Admissions, 47 U. 1ICH. J.L.
REFoRM 967 (2014). Sander is a well-known sophist and proponent of the mismatch objection to race
conscious admissions programs at universities. See infra Subsection V.B.ii.
4 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
47 FisherI, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
48 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011).
49 See EsherI, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
51Id

2016-2017
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Court vacates that judgment, but fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard
the case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can be
considered and judged under a correct analysis."52
C. Fisher II: On Remand andBack
On remand, following the Supreme Court's mandate, the Fifth Circuit
3
reevaluated the University's race-conscious admissions program.s The Fifth
Circuit, however, again found that the program survived a strict scrutiny analysis
and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.s 4 The Fifth Circuit also found
that the University's admissions program does not "function as an open gate to
5
boost minority headcount for a racial quota. Far from it." "[T]he impact of the
holistic review program on minority admissions is already narrow, targeting
students of all races that meet both the competitive academic bar of admissions and
have unique qualities that complement the contributions of Top Ten Percent Plan
admittees."s 6 In addition, the University "initiated a number of outreach and
scholarship efforts targeting under-represented demographics" by race-neutral
means.s" The University "implemented every race-neutral effort that its detractors
now insist must be exhausted .. . in addition to an automatic admissions plan not
required under Grutterthat admits over 80% of the student body with no facial use
of race at all."ss The Fifth Circuit concluded it is "settled that universities may use
race as part of a holistic admissions program where it cannot otherwise achieve
diversity," and the University's race conscious admissions program satisfied the
59
constitutional requirements for such a program.
The Fifth Circuit ruling in FisherHwas released on July 15, 2014.' A petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on February 10, 2015 and
granted on June 29, 2015.6" Fisher voiced her hope for a different outcome: "I hope
the justices will rule that [the University] is not allowed to treat undergraduate
62
applicants differently because of their race or ethnicity." Nonetheless, Gregory L.
52 _d

" SeegeneraslyFisherv. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 646. Perhaps sensibly, the use of affirmative action in order to meet a pre-determined racial
or ethnic quota is unconstitutional. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
5 Fisher, 758 F3d at 647.
Id. at 649.
" Id. at 660.
Id. at 633.
65 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin-2/ [https://perma.cc/7JZZ-RWUY] (last visited Mar.
21, 2017); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Courtto Wegh Race in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-wil-reconsider-affirmative-action2015),
case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UG22-QT6A] [hereinafter Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in
Admissions].
62 Liptak, supra note 61.
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Fenves, the president of the University, maintained that the race-conscious
admissions process is constitutional: "[T]he university's commitment to using race
as one factor in an individualized, holistic admissions policy allows us to assemble a
student body that brings with it the educational benefits of diversity . . . . Our

admissions policy is narrowly tailored, constitutional and has been upheld by the
courts multiple times."63

D. Fisher II: Back at the Supreme Court
At the December 9, 2015, oral arguments for FisherII, it was unclear how the
Supreme Court would decide the case. Without a doubt, however, it appeared clear
that at least Justices Antonin Scalia" and Clarence Thomas were "ready to issue a
major decision on the role race may play in government decision making.""s The
ruling, however, upheld the use of race in college admissions." Relying on his
relatively conservative jurisprudential method, Justice Anthony Kennedy
determined the University of Texas at Austin's race conscious admissions
program-developed in pursuit of the educational benefits of diversity-was
constitutionally sound. 67 Indeed, "[a] university is in large part defined by those
intangible 'qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make
for greatness.'"6' Thus, "[c]onsiderable deference is owed to a university in defining
those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its
identity and educational mission."6 9 Nonetheless, the Court held, "it remains an
enduring challenge to our Nation's education system to reconcile the pursuit of
diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.""o
The surprise outcome of Fisher II came as an enormous relief to many
advocates of affirmative action; especially considering many of those advocates "had
entered the term simply hoping the court would not use the case to ban all uses of
63

&

Id.
' Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scaia, Justiceon the Supreme
Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antoninscalia-death.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FA8A-PG3W]. It is unclear precisely how his death impacted
the outcome of Fisher I, although, in his absence, only seven justices participated in the ruling. See
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherII), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2199 (2016). It is speculated that Justice
Scalia would have dissented from the majority, he was a noted critic of affirmative action. See Adam
Liptak, Scala'sAbsence is Likely to Alter Court'sMajor Decisions Tns Term, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/us/politics/antonin-scalias-absence-likely-to-alter-courtsmajor-decisions-this-term.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/(UH5B-4BSK].
65 Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in Admissions, supra note 61; see also John M. Husband,
Affrmative Action: The Debate Rages On, COLO. LAw., Jan. 2015, at 39, 40; Warner, Land,
Berner, supra note 9, at 54-55.
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds AfirmativeAction Program at University of Texas, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2016), https*//www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmativeaction-university-of-texas.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/2TJG-HU5].
6 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherlD), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
65
6 9 Fsherll, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
7o

Id.
id.
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affirmative action."71 Scholars at universities across the United States acclaimed the
decision. 72 Phil Trout, the president of the National Association for College
Admission Counseling, exclaimed "I think there are going to be some parties
tonight in high school counseling offices and in college admissions offices." The
importance of FsherII, however, is not limited to the victory that emerged from a
predicted loss. Indeed, "in affirming the value of diversity, including race and
ethnicity, in higher education, the court recognized that there was not one,
immutable way of defining and achieving [diversity] ."14 The Court, however, failed
to eradicate the legal fictions enveloping affirmative action as we know it. The
importance of this result may only be fully appreciated after examining the legal
and sociopolitical history of race-based affirmative action.
7
II. SociopoLInCAL HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1

The term "affirmative action" was first used in reference to race by Executive
Order 10925, issued in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy.7 6 Executive Order
10925 encouraged executive branch offices to take "affirmative steps" to ensure the
full enforcement of "the national policy of nondiscrimination," particularly with
regard to federally funded employment.7 7 To further this initiative, Executive
Order 10925 also established the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity ("PCEEO").7 1 Contractors to whom the regulation applied were
required to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed,

1 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds University of Thxs Affrmative-Action Admissions,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https*//www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_1aw/supreme-court8 7
39
4d-11e 6 - f cupholds-university-of-texas-affirmative-action-adiissions/2016/06/23/513bcclOd4c723a2becb-story.htm utm term=.0ae8f40bl5ff [https://perma.cc/BW4D-N6Q6]; see also Tamar
Lewin & Richard Prez-Pefia, Colleges Bracefor Supreme Court Review of Race-Based Admissions,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), https-//www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/colleges-brace-forsupreme-court-review-of-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/V63A-NDWR] (describing predictions
that without affirmative action, 'colleges would have to turn their attention to sustained, intensive
recruitment to maintain diverse student bodies").
72 See Anemona Hartocollis, Supreme Court Decision on Affimative Action Cheeredby College
Admissions Experts, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supremecourt-decision-on-affirmative-action-cheered-by-college-admissions-experts.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/7EJ6-SCTZ].
7 Id.
74Id
7s The author is particularly grateful to George Edward "Trip" Carpenter III for providing literature
on issues addressed in Parts H1 and IH of this Note.
76 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. § 301 (1961); see also TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT
OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTION 60 (2004).
7
3 C.F.R. at § 201
78 Id.
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color, or national origin." 9 The PCEEO, chaired by then Vice President Lyndon
B. Johnson, was charged with enforcing the policy.'
Executive Order 10925 was intended to further an attempt to overcome both
past and current discrimination in employment. Executive Order 10925, however,
was far too general to effectuate its own purposes." The Kennedy administration
was "not demanding any special preference or treatment or quotas for minorities .
. . [A]11 the administration seemed to be advocating was racially neutral hiring to
end job discrimination."82 Not only did the order fail to define discrimination, but
it also failed to provide a meaningful enforcement mechanism for the PCEEO."
The language dedicated to the enforcement of the order read:
In the event of the contractor's non-compliance with the
nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any of the said
rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled in
whole or in part and the contractor maybe declared ineligible for
further government contracts in accordance with procedures
authorized in Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961.'
This weak "ma/7 language ensured there was no real obligation to enforce nondiscrimination measures in the context of employment. The most significant
weakness of the PCEEO, though, was that it did not apply to jobs that federal
loans or grants created, which neutered Executive Order 10925's scope."
Nonetheless, Executive Order 10925 marked a watershed moment: namely, the
first time in which affirmative action was established as a federal policy. And it was
only the beginning.
While the movement to undermine discrimination in employment reached its
zenith with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, affirmative action policy received little
attention until the following year.' In the summer of 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson re-centered the call for affirmative action policies in a speech to the
graduating class at Howard University. President Johnson cried:
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you
are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose
the leaders you please. You do not take a person who, for years,
Id. at§ 301.
a Id. at § 102(a); Lyndon Baines Johnson, 37th Vice President (1961-1963), U.S. SENATE,

7

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VPLyndonjohnson.htm

[https://perma.cc/6V57-M2H6] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).

81 See ANDERSON,
12

`

supra note 76, at 60-63.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
3 C.F.R. § 301(6) (emphasis added).

as ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 62.

6 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to compete with
all the others," and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of
opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk
through those gates.r
Johnson's foundational speech places the justification for affirmative action
programs squarely within the historical, moral cause of remedying the wrongs
historically committed against people of color in the United States." Indeed,
Johnson cited neither constitutional nor statutory grounds to justify affirmative
action programs." Rather, Johnson affirmed that "the social force that justified the
new doctrine of race-conscious affirmative action was history itself in the form of
past discrimination.""
While the importance of this historical recognition cannot be overstated,9i the
value of Johnson's speech as a whole is undermined by his failure to include any
acknowledgement of the role that discriminatory public policy played in fostering
systemic racism.' Rather than discuss the way in which systemic racism held back
black Americans and prevented their upward mobility, Johnson spoke in broad
terms. Johnson disappointingly focused on the decline of the black family rather
than systemic racism as one of the primary causes of racial inequality.93 Johnson
exclaimed "[a]bility is stretched or stunted by the family that you live with, and the
neighborhood you live in .... It is the product of a hundred unseen forces playing
upon the little infant, the child, and finally the man. 4
The dearth of a legal explaination of the cause of racial inequities and the
shifting of the justifications for affirmative action programs from that of public
policy to morality-though righteous-has had the long-term effect of
" Johnson, supra note 1.
" See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 77 (2002) ("[T]he Howard speech

metaphor of the unfair footrace captured the essence of a latent theory that programs of social justice
must compensate for past injustice.").
8 See id.
9
Id.
1 See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY

OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 10 (2005).
92
See id.
9 3Johnson, supra note 1. This same line of reasoning remains unfortunately potent today. See, e.g.,
Donald

J.

Trump, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017) (transcript available at

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-inaugurationspeech-transcript-annotated/utm term=5f10blef5963 [https://perma.cc/L3KY-FEST]) ("But for too
many of our citizens, a different reality exists: mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner
cities; rusted out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation; an education
system flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of all knowledge;
and the crime and the gangs and the drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so
much unrealized potential. This American carnage stops right here and stops right now.").
94
Johnson, supranote 1.
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undermining support for affirmative action programs. Indeed, the shifting of the
justifications for affirmative action away from a legal framework set the stage for
the emergence of sophistic arguments against affirmative action policies. This
phenomenon will be discussed in detail in Parts III and IV of this Note.
III. THE FALLACY OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

Criticism of affirmative action and claims of reverse discrimination are not
new."s White workers reacted with vitriol toward President Kennedy's first
antidiscrimination policies."6 One white worker decried Kennedy's actions as
"undemocratic, unreasonable, unwarranted, and unworkable."' These hyperbolic
attacks on all forms of affirmative action continue to be recycled by the right."
Unfortunately, though, the policy's admittedly weak historical justifications have
not helped. 9 As noted in Part II, because affirmative action was originally premised
on a vague understanding of history rather than on a deep, structural analysis of
racism, affirmative action programs are vulnerable to racist attack.'10 This Part of
this Note, however, will show how these racist attacks are flawed by examining the
three primary arguments against affirmative action. These include colorblind
constitutionalism, 0 ' the supposed lack of merit of affirmative action candidates and
their mismatch to schools,1 02 and the stigma associated with affirmative action
candidates.'o3 This Part of this Note will also refute each of these arguments.
A. ColorblindConstitutiondsm
So called "color blindness" is the root of one of the most persistent arguments
lodged against affirmative action. Indeed, "'[c]olor blindness' is a key idea in
American life. It is probably the most popular conception of what is thought to be
commendable racial thought and conduct.""'
Colorblind, or post-racial,

" SeeThomas J. Sugrue, The TangledRootsofAffirmative Action, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
886, 892-95 (1998).
' Id. at 894 (citing a quote from Peter Schoemann, national president of the Plumbers Union, as
saying "[w]e resent the use of the equal employment campaign as a reason for a federal takeover in an
area where government does not belong").
97

Id.

9 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, With Remarks in Afirmative Action Case, Scaka Steps into
Mismatch' Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/withremarks-in-affirmative-action-case-scalia-steps-into-mismatch-debate.html?ref=topics
[https-//perma.cc/7UPD-ZP4T] (discussing the prevalence of the "mismatch theory," which supposes
that minority students fare better at lower-ranked universities, but also noting that the theory is not
supported by evidence).
" See supra Part II.
'0 See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
'' See infr& text accompanying notes 104-133.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 134-175.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 176-192.
104 KENNEDY, supranote 9, at 147.

The Smug Assumption of Reverse Discrimination

20th-o17

719

constitutionalism stands for the premise that "race ought to play no role in
assessing individuals-that race ought to be absent from any calculation
determining whether a person is detained by police or sent to prison ... or selected
by a university."'os Colorblind constitutionalists fight against affirmative action
because it recognizes race and provides preferences to people of color.' As a
general matter, among supporters of colorblind constitutionalism, "[t]here is a
consensus .

.

. that whatever the proper status of affirmative action in the past, it

should have no place in American life today."107 Colorblind constitutionalism,
however-no matter the virtues proclaimed by the theory's supporters and
regardless of such supporters' potentially benign intent-is particularly useful as a
tool to preserve systemic racism.
One might first assume that colorblind constitutionalism would hold no weight
as an attack on affirmative action because affirmative action was conceived as a way
of remedying past discrimination.10 s Unfortunately, this is incorrect. In fact,
colorblind constitutionalists too point to history in justifying their assertions that
affirmative action requires "uprooting."'" But this history is revisionist. The single
most popular statement on colorblindness and the law was written by Justice
Marshall Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Harlan wrote:
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution
of the United States does not ... permit any public authority to
know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment
of such rights.

. .

. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is

- color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens."o
Supporters of colorblindness ignore the lack of historical or textual support for
Harlan's statement."' Indeed, "[tihere is little support to offer. Congressional
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment declined to accept language that would
have expressly prohibited government from drawing racial lines," even though such
language was proposed.'12 'Moreover, many of the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment countenanced laws that explicitly differentiated people on
a racial basis.""' And this is to say nothing of miscegenation laws, which Justice
Harlan sanctioned.114

1os Id
106 Id. at 148.
107 Id.
10" See KATZNELSON, supra note 91; Johnson, supra note 1.
1 KENNEDY, supranote 9, at 148.
110 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554, 559 (1896) (Harlan,
n See KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 150.
n2 Id. at 150-51.
n3 Id. at 151.
1

See generally Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).

J., dissenting).
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Perhaps with irony, colorblind constitutionalists oft omit Justice Harlan's
endorsement of white supremacy. 1 s One sentence removed from his statement on
the colorblindness of the Constitution in his Plessy dissent, Justice Harlan wrote
the followingThe white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for
all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty.1 6
Taken as a whole, what Justice Harlan appears to be claiming in his dissent is that
the white race is supreme, will remain supreme, and need not resort to segregation
in order to maintain power.1 1 7 This reading of Justice Harlan's dissent makes a
great deal more sense than that typically supported by colorblind constitutionalists.
"Justice Harlan-after all .

.

. was a former slave owner, initially opposed to the

Thirteenth Amendment, and tolerated various forms of segregation,
notwithstanding his Plessy dissent.""' Against this background, Justice Clarence
Thomas's support for Justice Harlan's colorblind jurisprudence comes off as pitiful:
"My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy."1 9
Justice Thomas, currently the only black member of the Supreme Court,M is
one of the most ardent supporters of colorblind constitutionalism. 121 justice
Thomas sees all racial classifications-even those designed to remedy past
discrimination and aid in the promotion of a more racially equal society-as
unconstitutional: "The worst forms of racial discrimination in this Nation have
always been accompanied by straight-faced representations that discrimination
helped minorities. . . . I think the lesson of history is clear enough: Racial

discrimination is never benign."122 Arguing in FisherI that the University's raceconscious admissions program was unconstitutional, Justice Thomas wrote that the
us See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116 Id. It is difficult to imagine a dearer statement of white supremacy. Perhaps John
C. Calhoun
was really a colorblind constitutionalist in disguise? See John C. Calhoun, Speech on Reception of
Abolition Petitions (Feb. 6, 1837), in THE WORKS OFJOHN C. CALHOUN 631-32 (Richard K. Crall6
ed., vol. 11, 1883).
n1 KENNEDY, supranote 9, at 152.
s Id.
11' Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
12
See Clarence Thomas, OYEz.COM, https://www.oyez.org/justices/clarence-thomas
[https://perma.cc/29YG-QAWQ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
121 See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 772; Aaron Blake, Clarence Thomas Compares Alfrmative
Action
Polcies
to
Segregation,
WASH.
POST
(June
24,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/06/24/clarence-thomas-comparesaffirmative-action-policies-to-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/YM8J-W2V8].
m Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher1), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2429-30 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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"University's professed good intentions cannot excuse its outright racial
discrimination any more than such intentions justified the now denounced
arguments of slaveholders and segregationists."" But this analogy is fallacious, and
Justice Thomas is wrong." 4
Justice Thomas's false equation of "racial distinctions intended to impose white
supremacy with racial distinctions" designed to abate white supremacy is one of the
strangest formulations in American law.12 Truly, "to argue that affirmative action,
which gives preferential treatment to disadvantaged minorities as part of a plan to
achieve social equality, is no different from the policies that created the
disadvantages in the first place is a travesty of reasoning."'2 Affirmative action is
not exclusionary. Affirmative action programs bear no relationship to Jim Crow
laws or historic Slave Codes.1 27 Indeed, "[ajffirmative action has not meant that
white men have unequal opportunities; rather, it has appropriately mandated an
end to prior quotas, preferences, and monopolies for white men only. None of the
current affirmative action policies in this country excludes white men . . . ."128 As
one of Justice Thomas's colleagues has written, "[t]here is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination."'" Indeed, Justice
Thomas's arguments have long been discredited.m As Justice Stevens elaborated:

123

Id. at 2430.

See KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 165-66.
Id. at 165.
16 Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism, or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Nov. 1993), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/11/reverse-racism-orhow-the-pot-got-to-call-the-kettle-black/304638/ [bttps-//perma.cc/HT5J-V5S3].
'2 See FRED L. PINCus, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: DISMANTLING THE MYTH 69 (2003). For
an excellent Kentucky example of a Jim Crow law, see Act of Jan. 5, 1904, ch. 85, 1904 Ky. Acts 181,
181-82 (1904). The statute, known as the "Day Law," prohibited private schools from admitting both
black and white students. Id. The law was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Berea
Coll. v. Commonwealth, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The most famous example of a historic slave code is that
of South Carolina's, passed after the famous Stono Rebellion. Act of May 10, 1740, 1740 S.C. Acts
163-75 (1740). Kentucky, of course, had one too. REV. STAT. KY. ch. XCII (1852).
124
125

128 BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY: COLOR BLINDNESS AND THE END OF

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 160 (1997).
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1o See id at 245. This favored section of Justice Stevens's dissent in Adarand also points out this
false equivalence, by providing:
[T]he term "affirmative action" is common and well understood. Its presence
in everyday parlance shows that people understand the difference between good
intentions and bad. As with any legal concept, some cases may be difficult to
classify, but our equal protection jurisprudence has identified a critical difference
between state action that imposes burdens on a disfavored few and state action
that benefits the few "in spite of" its adverse effects on the many.
Id. at 245-46 (footnote omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
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Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a
disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the
majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite
impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No sensible
conception of the Government's constitutional obligation to
"govern impartially" should ignore this distinction. 3 1
Indeed, to align with Justice Thomas, adhere to colorblind constitutionalism, and
disregard the distinction between positive and negative racial classifications is to:
disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a
welcome mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to
vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep
African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with
President Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a positive
factor. It would equate a law that made black citizens ineligible
for military service with a program aimed at recruiting black
soldiers. 132
With flawed foundations and damaging effects, colorblind constitutionalism
must be dismissed as virulent nonsense. Colorblind constitutionalism is an ideology
rooted in racism that functions as an affront to a racially egalitarian society and
aims to 'devour public policies much needed in the ongoing struggle against racial
hierarchy.""' Why this absurd formulation remains persistent is unclear, although
it is an unfortunately powerful social force. The only remedy against colorblind
constitutionalism, so it seems, may be to protest against its legitimacy, pointing out
the illogicality and ahistorical roots of the concept. Perhaps through education
alone may we work to overcome colorblind constitutionalism.
B. MeritandMismatch Objections
i. The Merit Objection
The concept of merit as an "objective phenomenon" that can be easily
ascertained, and that such a determination of merit should be the only relevant
factor in college admissions, is central to the merit-based argument against
affirmative action.' 34 "Disappointed opponents of affirmative action often tout their
test scores and grade point averages as if those indicia of merit" are the only
relevant considerations that a university's admissions program might appropriately

131 Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
132 Id. at 245.
133 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 168.
1' PINCUS, supra note 127, at 82.
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consider.' 35 These same "[d]isappointed candidates sometimes evince an especially
venomous antipathy for affirmative action because they see it as depriving them not
only of valuable opportunities but also cheating them of their just deserts on behalf
of those less deserving."" Implicit in this argument is the racist assumption that
affirmative action policies disregard merit in giving benefits to minority
individuals.' 3 7 There is usually no mention of the sense of entitlement espoused by
1
white, and typically male, opponents of affirmative action.' Rather, the merit
objection is based simply on the infeiorityof minority candidates.1 39 Echoing the
evangelical prosperity gospel, these opponents of affirmative action voice "'the
smug assumption . . . that success is the crown of virtue,' that those on top are on
top because they are more deserving than those below.""o
Supporters of the merit-based argument against affirmative action elevate test
scores "to some abstract level of scientific purity, especially in the areas of civil
service hiring and promotion as well as college admission .. .. Any race conscious
decisionmaking is seen as discrimination." 14' But in reality, a potential admitted
student's grade point average and standardized test scores are at least somewhat
subjective measurements of ability influenced by the socioeconomic background of
the test taker and teacher grading preferences. 1 4 2 Test scores are never entirely
objective because they elevate privileged students "who have been raised in
households where education is valued and emphasized, and whose families can
spend more on their children's education."' 43 Truly, a college admissions program
based purely on an objective level of merit could never exist. This is because even
so-called "objective" measures of a potential admitted student's educational prowess

13S KENNEDY,
136

Id.

supra note 9, at 112.

Id. at 112-13.
Abigail Fisher, a white woman, is an outlier. Three out of four opponents to race-based
affirmative action in Hopwood, a precursor of Fisher, were white men. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
938 (5th Cir. 1996). Petitioners in Gratz and Grutter-the cases that implicitly overruled Hopwood,
giving rise to Fisher-were a mix of women and men, but were all white. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 251 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316-17 (2003). The respondent in Bakke was a
white man. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266 (1978).
139 Padilla, supra note 19, at 862-64 (discussing the merit objection as applied to women and people
of color); see also KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 112-13.
140 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 113 (quoting MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT
THING TO Do? 178 (2009)). The merit objection to affirmative action echoes the "gospel of
prosperity," a uniquely American evangelical phenomenon. See, e.g., Kate Bowler, Death, the Prosperity
2016),
13,
TIMES
(Feb.
me,
N.Y.
and
Gospel
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/opinion/sunday/death-the-prosperity-gospel-and-me.html
[https://perma.cc/46B3-QQML]; Cathleen Falsani, The Prosperity Gospel, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worst-ideas/prosperity-gospel.html
[https://perma.cc/86XR-VWEY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
141 PINCUS, supra note 127, at 82 (citation omitted).
142 See id at 82-83; see also Padilla,supra note 19, at 865-66.
143 Padilla,supra note 19, at 865-66.
137
13
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are based on subjective evaluation techniques that are further influenced by a
student's socioeconomic background."
Of course, as always, there is irony in the merit-based argument against
affirmative action: "[M]eritocratic criteria are conveniently excluded when they
might give minorities some advantage."1 45 Compared with their white counterparts,
"grade point average and class rank suddenly become suspect" when used to
evaluate applicants of color, "given the allegedly lower standards in predominantly
minority high schools."'46
Supporters of the merit-based argument against affirmative action are also
strangely silent on the subject of legacy preferences. 4 7 "The use of race-based
affirmative action in higher education has given rise to hundreds of books and law
review articles" advocating for the ban of the practice." By comparison, however,
very little has been "said or written or done" to challenge legacy preferences for
children of alumni-or, affirmative action for the rich and typically white.149 "Like
racial preferences, preferences for legacies can be criticized for being based on
ancestry rather than individual merit," however, distinctly unlike racial preferences,
"legacy preferences were born of anti-immigrant and anti-Jewish discriminatory
impulses." 5 0 Supporters of legacy preferences attempt to downplay their impact on
admission decisions,' 5 1 but, "among applicants to elite colleges, legacy status is
worth the equivalent of scoring 160 points higher on the SAT (on a 400-1600
point scale).""s2 As of 2010, there had "been no state ballot initiatives, only one
lower court case, and not a single book-length treatment of the issue." 53
Legacy preferences were addressed, however, in 2016 when the president of
Georgetown University, John J. DeGioia, announced that the descendants of 272
slaves sold by Georgetown University in 1838 to pay debts would receive the same
admission advantages as students granted legacy preferences.'" Although it
received little media attention, there is great irony in DeGioia's comparison.
Children of alumni, thus beneficiaries of legacy preferences in admission, are

144 PINCUS, supra note 127, at 82-83; see also KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 113. For an interesting
discussion of disparate impact theory on black test takers at the United States Supreme Court, see

Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
1415 PINCUS, supra note 127, at
83.
46

1

147

Id.

See,

RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY

PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 1 (2010).
149

Id.

15 Id

152 Id

at 1-2 (citing Thomas

J.

Espenshade, Change Y. Chung & Joan L. Walling, Admission
Q. 1422,

Preferencesfor Minority Students, Athletes, and Lcqgacies at Ete Universities, 85 Soc. SCI.
1431 (2004)).

1s3 KAHLENBERG, supra note 147, at 2 (citing DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION:
How AMERICA's RULING CLASS Buys ITS WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES-AND WHO GETS LEFT
OUTSIDE THE GATES 2 (2006)).
154 Dan Golden, Manners & Aisdemeanors, TowN & COUNTRY, Feb. 2017, at 68.
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typically well off, or at least sufficiently privileged to be children of collegeeducated parents."ss Such children are in little need of aid through social justice
programs. Yet, in touting the progressive nature of Georgetown's new measure to
benefit the descendants of the 272 slaves, DeGioia was "equating a remedy" for
historic racial inequality-indeed, slavery-with legacy preferences, a policy "that
itself discriminates against low-income and minority students."1 s' It is certainly
interesting, to say the least, that the practice of providing children of alumni legacy
preferences in admission "has only intensified," in the same era that affirmative
action, the practice of providing low income and minority children better odds for
gaining an education, has come increasingly under attack.s7
The merit-based argument, similar to the colorblind constitutional argument,
1
privileges the experience of Whites, and particularly straight white males. ss
Implicit to the merit objection to affirmative action is the firm belief that the
necessarily unqualilled beneficiaries of affirmative action rob necessarily qualfied

non-beneficiaries of affirmative action of legitimate entitlements:1 59 "Many people
[who] believe the merit myth . . . . see affirmative action as taking away an

entitlement which would exist but for affirmative action."16o But college admission
in the United States is not an entitlement, and it has not been based on merit for at
least a century: "We have not defined public higher education in this century in
terms of merit-that is, who deserves to attend-but in terms of access-that is,
how to enable the broad public to attend."' 6 1 "[A]dmission is not about an honor
bestowed to reward superior merit or virtue. Neither the student with high test
scores nor the student who comes from a disadvantaged minority group morally
deserves to be admitted." 162 Indeed, a student's admission is only "justified insofar
as it contributes to the social purpose the university serves, not because it rewards
63
the student for her merit or virtue, independently defined."1

See generally DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: How AMERICA'S RULING
CLASS Buys ITS WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES-AND WHO GETS LEFr OUTSIDE THE GATES
(2006).
.5. Golden, supra note 154, at 68.
15s Id
15 SeegeneraIlyPadilla,supranote 19.
' Id. at 862.
'6 Id. The author has personally experienced many conversations with white men, and, perhaps
unsurprisingly, white women, who criticize affirmative action policies on this precise basis. Notably,
none of these individuals were ever denied admission to their preferred collegiate institution, or denied a
job because of their race. Nonetheless, these individuals express anger that race or sex could be
considered in collegiate admission--on the basis that they might be denied admission because they are
white. But, again, this has never happened. The position is one of either covert racism or willful
blindness to racial injustice.
161 William G. Tierney, The Parameters of Affirmative Action: Equity and Excellence in the
Academy, 67 REv. EDUC. RES. 165, 173 (1997).
162 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 113 (quoting MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHATS THE RIGHT
15

THING TO DO? 174 (2009)).
16 Id. (quoting MICHAEL

(2009)).

J.

SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 175

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

VOL. 105

The merit objection should hold no weight in the evaluation of affirmative
action programs because the objection is rooted in racism: that white applicantsespecially those with superior test scores-are entitled to college admission, while
minority applicants do not deserve college admission even ifthey have superior test
scores. This is because scores awarded by schools host to primarily minority
students are not reliable indicia of merit, while scores awarded by schools host
primarily to white students are reliable indicia of merit. This objection is not only
based in racism, but it misses the point: college admission is not an entitlement and
no one is morally entitled to or deserving of admission.'" Rather, admission is
determined based on the value, however defined, that candidates may contribute to
an academic institution. The merit objection-a theory so objectionable and
confused as to facts that even a cursory inspection reveals its inadequacies-should
be dismissed.
ii. The Mismatch Objection
Closely related to the merit-based argument against affirmative action is the
mismatch objection. Adherents of this theory maintain that affirmative action
"creates debilitating mismatches by overpromoting beneficiaries, putting them in
positions in which they are doomed to suffer dramatic negative comparisons with
better-prepared white peers.""s The work of Richard H. Sander exemplifies this
theory. He maintains that in the context of affirmative action in law schools, that
"blacks are the victims of law school programs of affirmative action, not the
beneficiaries."'" Sander, reflecting on the mismatch objection as a whole,
"denounces the strategy of pushing minority students upward into higher-prestige
schools than they would attend absent affirmative action because," as the theory
goes, such students are condemned to "school environments in which they learn
less than they would at less prestigious institutions."1 6 7 While some opponents of

1" Generally speaking, applicants do not have standing to sue when their application is rejected,
because rejected applicants never had an entitlement to a property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.")
161 Id. at 127-28. Justice Scalia was a proponent of the mismatch objection and he brought it up
during the oral arguments of 17sherff. See Hartocollis, supra note 98; Alison Somin, Justice Scaba and
Mismatch, FED. Soc. (Dec. 9, 2015), http-//www.fed-soc.org/blog/detai/justice-scalia-and-mismatch
[httpsl//perma.cc/R62X-8VU9].
16 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 128 (quoting Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of
AfirmativeAction in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367, 481 (2004)).
167 Id. at 128.
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affirmative action cite the mismatch objection as if it is irrefutable,' 5 the theory has
been met with significant scholarly attack.'
Although Sander notes real differences in the performance of minority and
white students at elite institutions that may suggest a need to reform some aspects
of affirmative action policies,1 70 in many cases where students are placed in an
environment with overachieving classmates, such students are "carried along to
7
more success," realizing better classroom results than they have in the past." ' In
any event, whether or not students placed in elite environments excel academically,
"the socialization, networking, and credentializing benefits of a degree from an elite
172
school dominate" the potential educational disadvantages discussed by Sander.
Even Sander concedes that without affirmative action elite schools would see a
significant decline in the enrollment of black students.1 7 1 Interestingly, however,
Sander estimates racial demographics at lower-ranked schools would change little
without affirmative action. In Sander's view, black students uplifted through
affirmative action would simply return to "where they belonged," and that "[m]any
of them would have dropped out or failed ... anyway."14
Among scholars, Sander is dismissed as a "wily, disingenuous enemy of
affirmative action." 7 s His mismatch theory is nothing but a clever work of
sophistry designed to undermine the positive public policy of correcting racial
inequities. The mismatch objection should be dismissed as such.
C. Stigma Objection
Not satisfied with their fallacious arguments against affirmative action policies
alone, opponents of affirmative action also seek to ridicule such programs'
beneficiaries. This is the root of the stigma objection to affirmative action policies,
which supposes "that affirmative action cripplingly stigmatizes its beneficiaries and,
indeed, anyone affiliated with groups that are perceived as eligible for affirmative

16 Hartocollis, supra note 72. The condescension of this theory is remarkable. At base, this author
would propose that the mismatch theory is premised on the presumed inability of black students to keep
up with their white counterparts in a competitive environment. Whether attributed to environmental
factors or biology, the mismatch theory is eugenicist refuse. It should be dismissed as such.
169 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 129; see also Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does AFirmativeAction
Reduce the Number ofBlack Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1807, 1809 (2005); David B. Wilkins, A
Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage:A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 191719 (2005).

170 RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR JR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

HURTS STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT 4 (2012).
171 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 129 (quoting Ayres, supra note 169, at 1824).
172 Id. at 130 (quoting Wilkins, supranote 169, at 1931).
173 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 130. This is a very real decline, documented by the New York
Times. See Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with Affirmative
Action Bans, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/afftrmative-actionbans.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YRP8-KK4S] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
174 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 130.
17 Id. at 131.
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action assistance."' 6 While some individualbeneficiaries of affirmative action may
perceive stigma associated with their achievement,17 7 a blanket statement about all
such beneficiaries would be inaccurate. "It is difficult to quantify ... with even a
modicum of precision how much of a stigmatic cost" is associated with affirmative
action.178 Further, very few beneficiaries of affirmative action complain of any such
stigma associated with their presence at elite schools; and, in any event, the
material benefits of affirmative action programs far outweigh such programs'
hypothetical stigmatic costs, especially when viewed in light of the relative absence
of social stigma imposed on beneficiaries of othercollege recruitment programs. 7 9
Indeed, it is axiomatic that opponents of affirmative action are the source of
this stigma. For unless there were some perceived reason to stigmatize minorities
and beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, no such stigma would exist. Perhaps
this explains the lack of stigma, or at least the lack of substantial structural
challenges, attached to legacy programs in college admissions.'" As noted, many
beneficiaries of legacy programs are among the most privileged students in
America.' 8 ' Although a specific study is wanting, it is likely that the opposite is
generally true of beneficiaries of affirmative action. ' But, given the similarities of
such programs, it is unclear what the cause of the stigma associated with affirmative
action would be, unless beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action are deemed
inferiorto the beneficiaries of legacy-based affirmative action, and therefore less
deserving.1

Naturally, "[i]t is Justice Clarence Thomas, however, who has voiced this theme
most persistently, aggressively, and personally, stating that affirmative action
'programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority' and complaining that 'socalled "benign" discrimination teaches many that . .. minorities cannot compete

176
177
171

Id. at 115.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.

179 Id.; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 436 U.S. 265,
404 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is an
element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning.
. . have given conceded preferences ... to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to
the affluent who may bestow their largess on institutions, and to those having connections with
celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.").
n See supra text accompanying notes 147-156.
1 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 147, at 1.
Id. (showing that minority students benefitted from affirmative action policies); see also
Fessenden & Keller, supra note 173 (showing the decline in minority enrollment following the abolition
of affirmative action in certain jurisdictions).
"1 As to the general lack of challenges against legacy programs, and the lack of stigma associated
with such programs, perhaps inequality of bargaining power is the best explanation. Broadly speaking,
the more power people have, the more substantial their influence. Wealth is associated with power. And
legal challenges cost money. It is intuitive that the well-off and influential would be in a better position
to successfully impose stigma and assert legal challenges--at least when compared to the theoretically
poor and uninfluential beneficiaries of affirmative action. Not that all beneficiaries of affirmative action
are poor and uninfluential, but many are. See KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 89.
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with them without their patronizing indulgence.'"' 1 Yet again, Justice Thomas's
.animosity toward affirmative action is wildly ironic in that it is hard to imagine
anyone who has benefited more than he has from affirmative action."'s Consider
the following:
President George H. W. Bush intimated that race had nothing
to do with the decision to select Thomas to fill the seat vacated
by the retirement of Justice Thurgood Marshall. But that can be
believed only by dint of the most willful and stupid naivet6. Of
course Thomas's race played a role, a major role, in his selection.
It is not accidental that he was selected to fill the seat vacated by
the first black member of the Court, the great Thurgood
Marshall.'"
Justice Thomas also ignores the fact that "[n]egative reaction upon being identified
as a beneficiary stems largely from the derogatory meaning placed upon affirmative
action by its enemies."' As noted, this too is rooted in racism: stigmatization of
affirmative action beneficiaries "is due as well to the inescapable inference that
those needing the boost of affirmative action are inferior."'
The vast majority of the concern for the stigmatization of affirmative action
beneficiaries is not rooted in genuine sympathy." Though some may be, and it is
pure condescension if it is, the majority of opponents of affirmative action who base
their arguments against such policies on the stigma objection are likely expressing
their own racist tendencies.'9 In any event, some scholars believe the proper
approach to the stigma objection is to:
(1) acknowledge its strength, (2) diminish avoidable harms
through careful design of affirmative action programs, (3) argue
against exaggerations of stigmatic harms, and (4) insist that,
ultimately, in reaching a conclusion about the wisdom of
affirmative action, its benefits must be weighed against its
drawbacks.' 91
This author, however, believes the stigma objection should be entirely disregarded.
It is nonsensical that potential stigma could be a reason to oppose affirmative

" Id. at 115-16 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (Thomas,
concurring)).
185 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 116 (emphasis added).
186
1
7

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 121.

See supra text accompanying notes 142-143.
" See supra text accompanying notes 142-143.
19 KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 124.
'"

J.,
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action policies. One cannot live one's life burdened and diminished by social
stigmas imposed by another.
Social stigma is a preposterous reason to abandon a workable, successful policy.
The benefits of affirmative action far outweigh the policy's potential cost, especially
in relation to any socially-constructed stigma. Indeed, stigma as an objection to
affirmative action simply does not make sense, unless one is willing to concede to
racism and racists. And this simply cannot be done. Supporters of race-based
affirmative action, and such programs' beneficiaries, should never be "misled by a
mistaken impression of where their best interests lie."1 92
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Affirmative action programs have a long history of challenges at the United
States Supreme Court. And, so far at least, the Supreme Court has upheld
affirmative action programs' constitutionality, so long as such programs satisfy strict
scrutiny. This Part of this Note discusses this constitutional law, while also
pointing out the legal fictions enveloping it.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,ln the foundational case for
affirmative action in the context of higher education, found the attainment of a
diverse student body to be a "dearly" constitutionally permissible goal for a
university. 19 4 In upholding the constitutionality of affirmative action programs,
however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect; call for the most exacting judicial examination, strict
scrutiny, are justified if and only if they further a compelling government interest,
and, even then, only in the case that no less restrictive alternative is available.'
The basis for the application of this strict scrutiny inquiry, however, was-and
remains-flawed. To justify this strict scrutiny, the Court held that if a university's
"purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential
purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid."19 According
to Bakke, "[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or
Id. at 127.
193 438 U.S. 265 (1978). It is notable that Bakke did not result in an opinion of the Court. See id.;
192

see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995). Nonetheless, the tenets of
Justice Powell's plurality opinion are now considered established law. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin (Fisher]),133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-18 (2013).
194 Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311.
195 Id. at 290-306; see abo Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.").
19 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
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19 7
ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids."
Bakke, however, disregards the distinction between positive and negative racial
preferences.lu
In summary, Bakke's reasoning is as follows: "remedying of the effects of
'societal discrimination,' [is far too] an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past."'9 "[I]solated segments of our vast governmental
structures [such as state universities] are not competent to make those decisions, at
least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria."200
As such, without constitutional or statutory violations, "it cannot be said that the
government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining
from harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling justification for
inflicting such harm." 2 0 1 Interestingly, the "harm" the Court is referencing is the
placement of black and minority college applicants on equal footing with their
white counterparts. The premise of this harm, unstated by the Court, is that
something must be "taken" from the white applicant in order to be "given" to the
black applicant. This presumes white applicants are entitled to admission, while
black applicants are not.
White applicants have no moral superiority over black applicants guaranteeing
them a place at an institution of higher learning. 202 Because there is no entitlement,
nothing can be taken from a white applicant by granting admission to a black
applicant. Nonetheless, from the outset, the constitutional law on race-based
affirmative action, while generally upholding such affirmative action programs, falls
into the trap of legal fiction. Most prominently, what this author terms "false
equivalences." The Bakke Court supposed that racial preferences-essentially,
quotas-may not be supported as such, even if the motivation is to remedy past
discrimination. 203 This is because racial distinctions are always bad, unless they are
motivated by a compelling governmental interest, and maybe not even then.2
Mandating that racial distinctions are always bad-perpetuating false equivalences
between positive and negative racial distinctions-and thereby limiting the manner
in which universities may use positive racial preferences to ameliorate the effects of

racism, has unfortunate practical results.

2 05

197 Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954)).
195 Other cases, however, directly address this distinction. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 245-46 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the false equivalence between positive
and negative racial preferences).
1" Bakke, 435 U.S. at 307.
` Id. at 309.
201 Id. at 308-09.
202 See Padilla,supra note 19, at 862.
' See supra notes 195-197. This is odd, given that the Court has approved of racial quotas in
government hiring where there was evidence of historic discrimination. See United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987). Of course, racial quotas are generally considered unconstitutional.
See supra text accompanying note 196.
See Fessenden & Keller, supra note 173.
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It is intuitive that racial quotas designed to remedy the effects of racial
discrimination would be more effective than almost any other means at establishing
racial diversity. And achieving racial diversity would necessarily foster the
educational benefits of diversity. 2 6 But positive racial distinctions-those that

would increase diversity-are indistinguishable from negative racial distinctionsthose that would diminish diversity-under the current constitutional regime.
Indeed, this blurring of the good and bad has the effect of denying universities the
discretion they need to use their educational, credentializing, and networking
benefits to remedy the effects of past and current racial discrimination.2? Under
Bakke, the purpose of helping certain groups of people who are victims of societal
discrimination may not justify a racial classification for admissions purposes2 5 This
is true in some cases even where individualized review of each applicant is
granted.209
In addition to the false equivalences trap, however, the Bakkce Court also fell
into another hole that this author terms "false standing." The Bakke Court held
"[w]e have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory violations." 210

This troubling language, also the source of the false equivalences problem, is
the basis of the "false standing" conferred on opponents of affirmative action
programs.211 As to the source of the Court's argument? The weak historical
justifications of affirmative action discussed in Part II of this Note. 212 Indeed, the
Supreme Court's mandate of the constitutional limitations imposed on
universities-barring them from attempting to redress the effects of racial
" Amy Stuart Wells, Lauren Fox, & Diana Cordova-Cobo, How Racially Diverse Schools and
Classrooms Can Benefit All Students, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/production.tcf.org/app/uploads/2016/02/09142501/HowRaciallyDiverseAmyStuart
Wells-11.pdf [https*//perma.cc/R82T-BEX5].
" See KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 130. There is, of course, a legal fiction flowing from this
reasoning. Universities might still use affirmative action programs to remedy the effects of past and
present discrimination. And they should.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-310 (1978).
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 293-94 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
210 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. Note the distinction in this language. The Court discusses programs
that aid "persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups," versus damage inflicted upon
"other innocent individuals." Id. (emphasis added). One may infer that it is the opinion of the Bakke
Court that people of color are only victims of perceived discrimination, not actual. And that such
perceived discrimination, even if real, is intangible--perhaps insufficient to provide an injury in fact
necessary for standing in federal court-while damage inflicted on white people-nay, individuals-is
actual, quantifiable, and most certainly sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Even if such injury is
based on a sense of entitlement. See supra Subsection III.B.i.; see ako Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (discussing the requirements of Article III standing in federal court).
211 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 26-31; Brief for Petitioner at 21-34, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief for Petitioner at 31-48, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
212 See supra Part H; see alsoJohnson, supra note 1.
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discrimination through affirmative action programs-has had lasting effect. With
this flawed statement of the law in hand, all an opponent of affirmative action need
do to establish standing is allege they were not admitted to a university because
they are white, that this was the case because of that university's flawed affirmative
action program, and that the university's affirmative action program is flawed on
the basis that it is motivated by an uncompelling governmental interest.213 This is
the case even though the injury is amorphous, unidentifiable, or perhaps even
nonexistent. 214 Will such an opponent's standing be challenged? Absolutely.215 Will
such challenge be successful? Absolutely not. 2 16
Bakke feeds the false equivalences problem by presuming the admission of black
students over white students may impose disadvantages upon white applicants who
bear no direct responsibility for the harm the beneficiaries of race-conscious
admission programs have suffered. 2 17 This is so even though no direct harm can be
established by a supposedly injured white applicant who is denied college
admission, especially because such "injured" white applicants often still gain an
education from another school. 218 Without direct injury-and with claims
bordering on the theoretical-how the challengers of Bakke, Gratz, Grutter, and
even FisherI& II, passed the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Article III standing
requirement is unclear.219 Indeed, this was a central theme of the oral arguments in
Fisher1220
213 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 18-20.

214 See infra notes 213-214 (showing injuries that are perhaps nonexistent have been used as bases
for successful challenges to affirmative action).
215 Se, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 16 n.6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher]), 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief for Respondent at 17-24, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Pisher 7),
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
216 The issue of standing was never resolved by the Supreme Court in either of the majority
opinions for Psher, although it was an issue throughout the case. See Fisher , 133 S. Ct. at 2418, 2420;
Fisher1, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. Standing was a significant issue in both Gmtter and Gratz. With almost
comedic simplicity-in both cases-the matter was resolved in favor of the petitioners. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) ("Petitioner clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit."); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003) ("After being denied admission, Hamacher demonstrated that he
was 'able and ready' to apply as a transfer student should the University cease to use race in
undergraduate admissions. He therefore has standing to seek prospective relief with respect to the
University's continued use of race in undergraduate admissions.").
217 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09; see also PINcUS, supra note 127, at 83.
218 The plaintiffs in both Gratz v. Bollinger and Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin were granted
admission to and gained an education at the university level even though they claimed injury by not
being admitted to a particular school. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758
F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014). It is unclear why the Supreme Court did not find both cases moot.
219 For an extensive inquiry into the requirements of Article III standing, see Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (discussing how the requirement that a plaintiff prove his or her
injury is both concrete and particularized); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (mandating that
for an injury to be particular, it must be personal); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)
(holding an injury must be direct and not hypothetical to establish Article Ill standing); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 67 (1986) (holding an ideological injury is insufficient to establish Article
standing).
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 54-56, Fisher vs. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345).
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Bakke upheld the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action programs in
the context of higher education so long as such programs satisfy strict scrutiny. In
so doing, however, Bakke fed fallacious claims of reverse discrimination-ignoring
the distinction between positive and negative racial preferences-and established
precedent for plaintiffs' false standing in affirmative action disputes. It is the legal
fictions established by Bakke that continue to empower opponents of affirmative
action in the federal courts.
B. Grutter andGratz
Petitioners in both Grutterand Gratz were white applicants to programs at the
University of Michigan. In both cases, the applicants were denied admission. In
both cases, the applicants sued, claiming they were discriminated against because
they were white.
i. Grutterv. Bofinger
Grutter v. Bolbnger fed into the same claims of reverse discrimination as did
Bakke. In addition, Grutterfurther restricted the ability of institutions of higher
education to institute affirmative action policies. Grutterreaffirmed that all racial
classifications imposed by government "must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny," meaning "such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests."221 Gruteralso
reaffirmed that the government has a compelling interest in attaining the benefits
of a diverse student body in higher education, but not in remedying the effects of
racial discrimination.' Grutter also reaffirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause requires that a university's admissions program remain
flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not
in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or
her application. 2 2

Grutter, however, reduced the scope of permissible means for a university to
consider race in admissions. Under Gruter, to be narrowly tailored under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "a race-conscious
admissions program cannot use a quota system [or] 'insulate each category of
applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants.'224 Rather, "a university may consider race or ethnicity only as a '"plus"
in a particular applicant's file,' without 'insulating the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats.'"22' This has the effect of making it
2
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
2 Id. at 328-33.
SId. at 336-39.
Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
225 Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
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more difficult for a university to operate a race-based affirmative action program.
This is consistent with the reasoning of Bakce, but it is not desirable. Further
restricting the methods through which a race-based affirmative action program
may be implemented naturally limits the ability of such programs to operate as an
effective means of achieving diversity. But considering that the Supreme Court's
goal may be to do exactly that, because aflracial distinctions are bad unless they are
2
justified by a compelling governmental interest, 26 Grutter's most alarming
statement may come as no surprise: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today."2 27
ii. Gratz v. Bolinger
Gratz v. Bollinge, handed down the same day as Grutter, also ascribed to the
reverse discrimination rationale and limited the way in which institutions of higher
education may implement affirmative action programs. Gratz, consistent with
Bakce and Grutter, maintained that a university may promote its compelling
interest in achieving the benefits of diversity in higher education through
affirmative action programs, but that such a program must be executed through
228
narrowly tailored means, and it must be capable of surviving strict scrutiny. This
is because any person has the right to demand that any governmental actor justify
any racial classification subjecting said person to unequal treatment under the most

See supra text accompanying notes 202-206.
' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. This position is ludicrous because it is premised on the belief that
racial inequities have been mended, or that they will be, now within the course of eleven years. All one
needs to do to find proof as to whether racial inequities and bias have been corrected in American
society is to take a cursory view of Donald Trump's 2016 campaign for the American Presidency. See
generally Nicholas Kristof, Is Donald Trump a Racist?, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2016),
httpl//www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-racist.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5J85-LSSL]; Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Clung to 2irther'Liefor Years, and
Still
Isn't
Apologetic,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2016),
http-//www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/donald-trump-obama-birther.htmi
[https://perma.cc/L77C-MCWQ]; Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Why Blacks Loathe Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/opinion/why-blacks-loathe-trump.htm
[https-//perma.cc/4KGH-CTDR]; Jen~e Desmond-Harris, Opinion, Racism Is Real. Trump Helps
Show lt., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), http-//www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/opinion/campaignstops/the-upside-to-overt-racism.html [https*//perma.cc/Q63W-R7GJ]; Jessie Daniels, Letter to the
Editor, The Popularity of Donald Trump's Racism, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/opinion/the-popularity-of-donald-trumps-racism.html
[https://perma.cc/WM24-7NB5]; Full Text.- Donald Trump Announces a PresidentialBid, WASH.
POST (June 16, 2015), https*//www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-textdonald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ [https-//perma.cc/N8AD-VP8X].
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-70 (2003).
2
22
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strict of judicial scrutiny." Gratz, however, also invalidated points-based
admission systems that consider raceP?
The Court held "the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored
to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their
program."23 ' This is because, based on the flawed reasoning of Bakke, "[p]referring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake," 2 and the Court feared the points-based system
denied applicants individual review.2 3 This is interesting.
Grutter mandates that race may only be considered as a "plus" factor in
evaluating a candidate for admission to a university. 34 In Grat, where being a
member of an underrepresented minority Bteraly operated as a plus factor in
evaluating candidates for admission to the university, the use of race was held to be
unconstitutional.s How can this be? Something cannot be both constitutional and
unconstitutional at the same time. The Gratz Court nonetheless rationalized its
decision, explaining that the use of race as a literal plus factor did not allow for
"individualized consideration."2 6 Although it is sensible that any candidate for
admission to a university should be given individualized consideration, it is not
necessarily true that the literal operation of a plus factor denies candidates such
individualized consideration. In Gratz, for example, there was ample evidence that
such individualized consideration was indeed given. Justice Souter pointed out this
problem in his dissent.3'
2

Id. at 270.

' Id. at 270-75 (finding that the policy could not survive the narrow tailoring requirement of strict

scrutiny analysis, even though the university had a compelling interest in attaining the educational
benefits of diversity in higher education).

Id. at 270.
Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
2 Id. at 270-274.
m Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
23 See Gratz 539 U.S. at 274 ("But the fact that the 'review committee can look at the applications
individually and ignore the points,' once an application is flagged ... is of little comfort under our strict
scrutiny analysis. The record does not reveal precisely how many applications are flagged for this
individualized consideration, but it is undisputed that such consideration is the exception and not the
rule in the operation of the LSA's admissions program.").
6 Id. at 271.
m7 See id. at 293-94 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter's dissent is notable for a variety of its points.
One is that individualized consideration was granted to the petitioners:
231

232

The plan here, in contrast, lets all applicants compete for all places and values
an applicant's offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but on grades,
test scores, strength of high school, quality of course of study, residence, alumni
relationships, leadership, personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic
ability, and quality of a personal essay.
Id. at 293-94. Another is that the dissent provides a concise explanation of the law following
Grutter,which Gratz should have been found to satisfy-
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Grutter and Gratz were losses for proponents of affirmative action, even if
affirmative action programs were upheld generally. Taken together, the cases
require that a university may consider race in evaluating candidates through its
admission program if and only if race is considered merely as a "plus" factor.. and
candidates are given "individualized consideration."1n' Upholding Bakke, the cases
also express that quotas may not be used in affirmative action programs. Under this
framework, it is still possible to operate a race-conscious admissions program.240
Nonetheless, the cases fail to recognize the false equivalences established by Bakke,
fimdamentally impairing the ability of universities to use affirmative action
programs to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, thereby redressing the
effects of racial discrimination. Further, the cases perpetuate the ability of white
applicants with amorphous or nonexistent injuries to attack affirmative action
programs in the federal courts through their false standing.
C. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
Schuette v. BAMN, though unique, is important to any consideration of the
41
perils of race-based affirmative action programs in the federal courts. 2 Released
between FisherI and II, this case reveals the hostile state regulatory environment
facing universities with race conscious admission programs.2 42 Schuette held that no
authority in the United States' Constitution would allow the Court to set aside an

The cases now contain two pointers toward the line between the valid and
the unconstitutional in race-conscious admissions schemes. Grutter reaffirms the
permissibility of individualized consideration of race to achieve a diversity of
students, at least where race is not assigned a preordained value in all cases. On
the other hand, Justice Powell's opinion in [Bakke] rules out a racial quota or setaside, in which race is the sole fact of eligibility for certain places in a class.
Although the freshman admissions system here is subject to argument on the
merits, I think it is closer to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke
condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the current record.
Id. at 293.
2 Grurrer,539 U.S. at 334.
2 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
240 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherI), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205, 2214-15 (2016).
21 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affsrmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) [hereinafter Schuette v. BAMN].
242 See Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT'L. CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2014),
[https://perma.cc/RV3Ehttp://www.ncsl.org/research/education/afftrmative-action-state-action.aspx
G4V6] (showing various legislative efforts to thwart affirmative action).

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

Vol. 105

amendment to a state's constitution, here, that of Michigan,4 prohibiting
affirmative action in public education, employment, and contracting, which had
been adopted by state voters by initiative. 2 4 This case, perhaps better than the rest,
shows the Court's potential hostility-or at least unwillingness to intervene-to
affirmative action programs on the eve of FisherIi
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor precisely expressed this author's position: "The
Constitution does not protect racial minorities from political defeat. But neither
does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers against racial
minorities."24 5 By permitting the state constitutional amendment to stand in
Schuette, the Court permitted "the majority to use its numerical advantage to
change the rules mid-contest and forever stack the deck against racial minorities in
Michigan." 2 6 Traditionally, the federal courts have been protectors of the rights of
minorities. But, following Schuette, this traditional role of the federal courts was
brought into question, at least with regard to state ballot initiatives-this time
banning affirmative action: "For members of historically marginalized groups,
which rely on the federal courts to protect their constitutional rights, the [Schuette]
decision can hardly bolster hope for a vision of democracy that preserves for all the
right to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government." 247 Indeed, there
is such a thing as tyranny of the majority. 248
243 Michigan banned the use of affirmative action in the context of higher education
by state
constitutional amendment. But this has not changed the legal position of the University of Michigan.
The University of Michigan filed amici curiae briefs in support of the University of Texas at Austin's
race-conscious admissions program twice: both in FisherlandI SeeBrieffor Leading Public Research
Universities The University of Delaware, The Board of Trustees of The University of Illinois, Indiana
University, The University of Kansas, The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, The
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, The Ohio State University, The Pennsylvania State University, and
Purdue University as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin

(Fisherl), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief for the University of Michigan as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 4-5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherI), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016)
(No. 14-981) [hereinafter Michigan's Brief].
U-M's experience demonstrates that the limited consideration of race, as one
factor among many in a holistic and individualized admissions program, is
necessary to attain the educational benefits of student-body diversity. And when
the Court previously considered this case, the University joined an amicus brief
arguing that the limited consideration of race in admissions was consistent with
equal protection principles. The University continues to believe that is so.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
244

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (citing Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967)) ('lhis

case is not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved. It is about who may resolve
it. There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court's precedents for the
Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to the voters.").
245 Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
24

6 Id.
247 d
248 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
2002) (1835); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Batoche Books 2001) (1859); THE FEDERALIST

No. 51 (James Madison).
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V. FISHER 1: BACK AT THE COURT

FisherH1 was a triumph for proponents of affirmative action programs. The
case, however, preserves legal fictions, and the case's potential inconsistency with
Bakke leaves numerous questions unanswered. This Part of this Note discusses
these matters pertaining to FisherH and the case's impact on the law of affirmative
action in the context of higher education.
A. The Universityof Texas atAustin's Race-ConsciousAdmissions Progran:
Facts and ProceduralFIstory, Revisited
As noted in Section I.A., applicants to the University who are not granted
admission through the Top Ten Percent Plan must participate in the University's
holistic review program. In addition to class-ranks, SAT/ACT scores, and grades,
this holistic review program includes the consideration of essays, letters of
recommendation, resumes, writing samples, artwork, and any other materials
submitted by applicants. 249 The University also considers "leadership experience,
extracurricular activities, awards/honors, community service, and 'special
circumstances.'" 25 0 "Special circumstances" include socioeconomic status, familial
responsibilities, whether applicants reside in a single-parent home, their first
language, and-finally-race. 251' Extensive measures are undertaken to ensure
candidates are evaluated for admission fairly: "Therefore, although admissions
officers can consider race as a positive feature of a minority student's application,
there is no dispute that race is but a 'factor of a factor of a factor' in the holisticreview calculus."252
253
Abigail Fisher applied for admission to the University's 2008 freshman class.
She failed to complete her high school education in the top ten percent of her class,
therefore she was not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Program. 2 5 Thus,

her application-along with 17,131 others-was considered for one of the
25 6
remaining 1,216 seats for Texas residents. 25 5 Fisher's application was denied.
Fisher filed suit in the Western District of Texas, alleging the University's
consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
258
Fisher
Fourteenth Amendment. 257 She lost, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

249

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisherl), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016).

250 Id.
251Id.
252

2009)).
253
2 54

Id. at 2207 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex.
Id
S

id.

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).
256 Msherl1, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
* Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
* Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011).

2"

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

740

VOL. 105

sought a rehearing en banc, and her petition was denied.2 59 Fisher then appealed to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari36 Without making a judgment as to
the constitutionality of the admissions program of the University, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case.26' The
Fifth Circuit again upheld the judgment of the district court.262 As a resut, Fisher
sought another rehearing en banc, which was again denied.263 Fisher appealed to
the Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted? Finally, Fisher lost.265
B. Outcomes: Fisher I Meets Fisher II
i. Exasperated Determination
Placing weight on the University's "sui generil' admissions program, the
Supreme Court first noted "[t]he component of the University's admissions policy
that had the largest impact on petitioner's chances of admission was not the
school's consideration of race under its holistic-review process but rather the Top
Ten Percent Plan."2" Indeed, "[b]ecause petitioner did not graduate in the top 10
percent of her high school class, she was categorically ineligible" for a large majority
of the seats available at the University.2 6 7 Nonetheless, presumably because the Top
Ten Percent Plan does not facially consider race, Fisher never challenged itleaving an evidentiary gap in the case that could not be adequately filled? Further,
the Top Ten Percent Plan was a statutory scheme over which the University had no
control, and kept little records of, thus it proved impossible for the Court to have a
clear image of the total number of individuals potentially adversely affected by the
University's race-conscious admissions plan.269 Determining it was too late to
correct these flaws in the record, the Court limited its decision to "whether,
drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, petitioner has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was denied equal treatment at the time her
application was rejected."2 70

' Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
' Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
261 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
262 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
263 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
21 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
265 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
2 Id. at 2208-09.

at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2011).
at Austin, 565 U.S. 1195, 1195 (2012).
at Austin (Fisher]),133 S. Ct. 2411,2421-22 (2013).
at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).
at Austin, 771 F.3d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2014).
at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888, 2888 (2015).
at Austin (FiherD),136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016).

267 Id. at 2209. This is the only occasion the Supreme Court directly addressed Fisher's
lack of
credentials. "It seems quite plausible, then, to think that petitioner would have had a better chance of
being admitted to the University if the school used race-conscious holistic review to select its entire
incoming class, as was the case in Grutter." Id.
268
Id.
269 S id.
270

Id. at 2210.
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ii. Refutation of Abigail Fisher
Fisher alleged four primary arguments against the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit. First, Fisher argued the University failed to articulate a compelling
governmental interest in considering race in its admissions program.2 71 Second,
Fisher argued the University had "no need to consider race because it had already
'achieved critical mass.'"272 Third, Fisher argued 'considering race was not necessary
because such consideration has had only a '"minimal impact" in advancing the
University's compelling interest.>"27m Finally, Fisher argued race-neutral means
could achieve the University's compelling interest in the educational benefits of
diversity. 274
a. Compellng Interest
Fisher maintained that the University should have alleged the precise number of
minority students that would have constituted a critical mass.275 This was effectively
a trap designed by Fisher to ensnare the University in an unconstitutional quota
system. 2 76 The Supreme Court recognized this, stating a university may only
"institute a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining 'the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.'" 277 Further,
"[i]ncreasing minority enrollment may be instrumental to these educational
benefits, but it is not, as petitioner seems to suggest, a goal that can or should be
reduced to pure numbers." 27 8 Because the University set forth "precise goals"identifying the values the University sought to achieve through a diverse student
body and why the University sought to achieve those values for its students"[p]etitioner's contention that the University's goal was insufficiently concrete is
rebutted by the record." 2 79

271

Id

272 Id. at 2211 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198

(2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 5261568).
.73 Id. at 2212 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin (Fisherl),

136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); see also Oral Argument at 22:25-23:16, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin (Fisher fl), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981; Id.
at 24:17-25:2; Id. at 25:24-26:16.
274 FisherII, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
275 Id. at 2210.
276 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (holding the use of a racial
quota system to be unconstitutional).
27 Fisher I, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher ), 133 S. Ct.

2411, 2419 (2013)).
278
279

d
Id. at 2211.
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b. CiticalMass
Fisher argued the University had no reason to consider race in its admissions
program because the University had already attained a "critical mass" of minority
students. 2 80 While Fisher was correct that a university demonstrating race-neutral
alternatives will not suffice in a university's pursuit of attaining the educational
benefits of diversity, the University had pursued such race-neutral alternatives, and
the alternatives failed 8 ' Indeed, "[b]efore changing its policy the University
conducted 'months of study and deliberation, including retreats, interviews, and
review of data,' and concluded that 'the use of race-neutral policies and programs
had not been successful. . . "'8
The Court noted the "significant evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in
support of the University's position" existed.? The Court quoted demographic
data, noting:
In 1996, for example, 266 African-American freshmen enrolled,
a total that constituted 4.1 percent of the incoming class. In
2003, the year Grutter was decided, 267 African-American
students enrolled-again, 4.1 percent of the incoming class. The
numbers for Hispanic and Asian-American students tell a similar
story. Although demographics alone are by no means dispositive,
they do have some value as a gauge of the University's ability to
enroll students who can offer underrepresented perspectives.2
The Court then went on to quote further numeric data from 2002, when the
University still relied on its race-neutral Hopwood regime,285 considering the
percentages of classes with minorities represented versus those without? The
Court sided with the University, acknowledging the University's careful
consideration of the quotient of minority students versus white students enrolled

280

d
Id
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting app. 446a; Supplemental Joint Appendix at 25, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981)).
21 Id. at 2212.
284 Id. (citing Supplemental Joint Appendix at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherIl), 136
S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981)).
285 Hopwood invalidated the consideration of race in college admissions throughout the Fifth
Circuit. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996). Hopwood was implicitly overruled by
Grutterand Gratz in 2003. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); see aso Fisher H, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. In 2003, the University of Texas at Austin altered its
admissions program in compliance with Grutterand Gratz. Id. at 2205-06.
286 FisherII, 136 S. Ct. at
2212.
281
282
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when race was not considered in admissions. 2 8 This carefuil consideration of
quotients, in addition to "evidence that minority students admitted under the
Hopwood regime experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation," supported the
University's decision to consider race through its holistic review program.2S8
c. Minimal Impact
Fisher also claimed the University's consideration of race was unnecessary
because it had only a small impact in increasing diversity at the University.2 8 To
rebut this claim, the Court cited additional quotients:
In 2003, 11 percent of the Texas residents enrolled through
holistic review were Hispanic and 3.5 percent were AfricanAmerican. In 2007, by contrast, 16.9 percent of the Texas
holistic-review freshmen were Hispanic and 6.8 percent were
African-American. Those increases--of 54 percent and 94
percent, respectively-show that consideration of race has had a
meaningfd, if still limited, effect on the diversity of the
University's freshman dass.2
Regardless, the Court mandated that a university's race-conscious admission
program is overly broad if it does not follow from the fact that a university's
consideration of race impacts only a small number of admissions decisions.291
Indeed, "[t]he fact that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of
admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring."29
d. Race-NeutralMeans
Fisher's final argument in support of her general proposition that the
University's race-conscious admissions program violated the Equal Protection
Clause was that the University should have relied solely upon race-neutral means of
achieving diversityY 3 But the University already had implemented a number of
race-neutral means-"the University spent seven years attempting to achieve its

27 See Id. ("In 2002, 52 percent of undergraduate classes with at least five students had no AfricanAmerican students enrolled in them, and 27 percent had only one African-American student. In other
words, only 21 percent of undergraduate classes with five or more students in them had more than one
African-American student enrolled. Twelve percent of these classes had no Hispanic students, as
compared to 10 percent in 1996.").
288
289

Id
Id

' Id. (internal citations omitted).
291
29

d

d

2
2 93 Seeid
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compelling interest using race-neutral holistic review"-all of which failed. 94 And
Fisher failed "to offer any meaningful way in which the University could have
improved upon them." 29 5 Fisher did argue in favor of uncapping the statutory Top
Ten Percent Plan, but she overlooked "the fact that the Top Ten Percent Plan,
though facially neutral, cannot be understood apart from its basic purpose, which is
to boost minority enrollment. Percentage plans are 'adopted with racially
segregated neighborhoods and schools front and center stage.'2% The Top Ten
Percent Plan is not a race-neutral means; "[c]onsequently, petitioner cannot assert
simply that increasing the University's reliance on a percentage plan would make its
admissions policy more race neutral."297
C. Impact: The MeaningofFisher II for Race-BasedAffrmative Action
FisherH confirmed the meaning of Fisher I, noting the central tenets of the
case included "[r]ace may not be considered by a university unless the admissions
process can withstand strict scrutiny;" and that "the decision to pursue 'the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity' . . . is, in substantial

measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial
deference is proper."2" Thus, once a reasonable explanation is given for the
consideration of race in admissions, deference must be given to the university for
the decision. But "no deference is owed when determining whether the use of race
is narrowly tailored to achieve the university's permissible goals." 2" A university,
FisherI explained, bears the burden of proving a "'nonracial approach' would not
promote its interest in the educational benefits of diversity" nearly as well and at
reasonable cost.30
Aside from providing clarity to the meaning of FisherI, FisherII left many
open questions. For instance, what is the impact of FsherIIonfalse standing? The
case highlights the merit objection, and calls out legacy preferences, but what does
this mean? Most important for purposes of this Note, however, what is the impact
of Fisher H on the problem of false equivalences? This Section of this Note
discusses these questions, and such questions' positive and negative implications.
i. Merit, False Standing, and Legacy Preferences
Fsher II rebutted the merit objection to affirmative action."'o In rebutting
Fisher's suggestion that academic credentials should be accorded higher value than
294

29 5

Id. at 2213.

d

Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
2

m~ Id.
298

301

Id. at 2208 (quoting Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2418, 2419).
Id. (citing FisherI, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20).
Id. (quoting Fisherl, 133 S. Ct. at 2420).
See id. at 2213-15.
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other unique qualities of a person, the Court, echoing Randall Kennedy,
expounded:
A system that selected every student through class rank alone
would exclude the star athlete or musician whose grades suffered
because of daily practices and training. It would exclude a
talented young biologist who struggled to maintain aboveaverage grades in humanities classes. And it would exclude a
student whose freshman-year grades were poor because of a
family crisis but who got herself back on track in her last three
years of school, only to find herself just outside of the top decile
of her class. 302

This is not the first time the Court has shown venom toward the merit objection,"'
although it is the most direct. This statement provides great encouragement to
proponents of affirmative action programs who have long objected that test scores
are not a sufficient measure of a student's ability to make a meaningful contribution
to a university's student body. Unfortunately, however, neither the mismatch nor
the stigma objection was rebutted.
Fisher's lack of standing to challenge the University's race-conscious admissions
program was an issue throughout the case. 30 Although the Court never resolved
the matter,as the Court may have made a sly reference to the controversy in its
final disposition of the case. Indeed, it was the opinion of the Court that Fisher
"has been litigated on a somewhat artificial basis."3' Bakke, the source of the false
standing doctrine, 30 though not repudiated by this statement, may now be
weakened. In any event, the door may now be open to more directly challenge the
"artificial" standing of affirmative action opponents. Although it is possible that
affirmative action opponents might have their injuries categorized as "capable of

Id. at 2213.
' Se, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (noting percentage plans "may preclude
the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that
is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university").
3' See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 16 n.6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisherl), 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief for Respondents at 17-24, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (FisherD),
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
" See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin (Fisherl), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).
3 Fisheri,136 S. Ct at 2209.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09 (1978); see supra Subsection TH.B.i.;
see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992) (discussing the requirements of Article
III standing in federal court).
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repetition, yet evading review,"sos this is unclear, because it is not certain that
rejected applicants have standing to challenge such a rejection to begin with."
Though perhaps misplaced,3 10 Justice Alito's dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, brought up a valuable point: legacy preferences. 3 11
The University's legacy system is opaque31 2 and secretive3 1 . Under the unspoken
legacy program, university officials override the "normal holistic review to allow
politically connected individuals-such as donors, alumni, legislators, members of
the Board of Regents, and UT officials and faculty-to get family members and
other friends admitted to UT, despite having grades and standardized test scores
substantially below the median for admitted students." 3 4 Although the existence of
the University's legacy program was denied by counsel for the University,"' there is
no question that a legacy program does, in fact, operate at the University. 31u
The existence of the covert legacy program is cited by Justice Alito as evidence
of bad faith on the part of the University.317 While the University's efforts to
conceal the program throughout the course of litigation of the Fishercases may
implicate bad faith-are we surpised Legacy programs exist throughout the
United States. 18 And it is indisputable that legacy programs provide an advantage
to the privileged, whether the precise details of the programs, or their existence, are
made public or not."' Nonetheless, it is pleasing to see the questionable nature of
a See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498,515 (1911).
Fisher claimed standing under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
was opposed throughout the litigation. See FsherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08; supra text accompanying
notes 218-220; see also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (rejected applicants do not
have standing under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
310 See FsherII, 136 S. Ct. at 2211-12 ("At no stage in this litigation has petitioner challenged the
University's good faith in conducting its studies, and the Court properly declines to consider the
extrarecord materials the dissent relies upon, many of which are tangential to this case at best and none
of which the University has had a full opportunity to respond to."); see aso id. at 2240 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
311 FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31
Id. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN-INVESTIGATION

a

OF ADMISSIONS PRACTICES AND ALLEGATIONS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 43 (Feb. 6, 2015),

https-//www.utsystem.edu/sites/utsfles/documents/outside-reports/investigation-admissions-practicesand-allegations-undue-influence/investigation-admissions-practices-kroll-2015-02.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/7HA6-CZTY]).
" See Bobby Blanchard & Christy Hoppe, Influential Texans Helped Underqualifled Students
Get
Into
UTI
DALL.
MORNING
NEWS
(July
2015),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2015/07/20/influential-texans-helped-underqualifiedstudents-get-into-ut [https-//perma.cc/XK9J-9GPJI.
31 FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting).
315 Id.
316

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AuSTIN-INVESTIGATION OF ADMISSIONS PRACTICES AND
OF
UNDUE
INFLUENCE
29
(Feb.
6,
2015),

ALLEGATIONS

https-//www.utsystem.edu/sites/utsfiles/documents/outside-reports/investigation-admissions-practicesand-allegations-undue-influence/investigation-admissions-practices-kroll-2015-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HA6-CZTY] [hereinafter Kroll Report].
317 FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2240 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
318 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 147, at 1.
319 See id.
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legacy programs brought to light in the Fisher litigation. If the white privileged
opponents of affirmative action are granted false standing to challenge affirmative
action in court, it is appropriate, at a minimum, that white-privileging legacy
programs are criticized too.
ii. Quotas and False Equivalences
fisher II upheld the consideration of race in college admissions, and the case
provided guidance on the manner in which race may specifically be considered. In
so doing, however, the Court may have blurred the constitutional law on the
matter.3 20 Bakke determined racial preferences, essentially, quotas, may not be
supported even if the motivation is to remedy past discrimination.321 This gave rise
to the false equivalences problem, discussed in Section IV.A. of this Note. The
Fisher H Court maintained that quotas may not be considered, noting "the
University is prohibited from seeking a particular number or quota of minority
students."3 22 Nonetheless, the Court discussed quotients, numeric data, and
statistical evidence throughout the majority opinion.32 Does this mean universities
are now free to consider quotas? Probably not, or at least not exclusively. The
quotients considered by the Fisher H Court were not directed at any specific
numeric goal and the quotients were considered along with a host of other
information such as "anecdotal evidence." 324
The real concern with the Court's consideration of the numeric data is that it
promotes a legal fiction. Quotient is defined by Merriam-Webster as "the number
resulting from the division of one number by another," or "the magnitude of a
specified characteristic or quality."3 25 It is axiomatic that student-body diversity,
especially when measured, considering factors such as the racial and sexual
demographics of the student body, necessarily involves some consideration of
numbers and the way such numbers relate to one another. No matter how the
Court chooses to characterize these numbers, as a "critical mass" or otherwise,

" Quotas may not be considered under Bakke, which was adopted as a constitutional standard
under Grutter. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-17 (1978)). Nonetheless, the FisherICourt considered quotients and a vast
array of numeric and statistical data in support of the University of Texas at Austin's consideration of
race in college admissions. See, e.g., Misher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. Does this mean quotas may be
considered? "[T]he University is prohibited from seeking a particular number or quota of minority
students." Id. at 2210.
321 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
322 Fisher , 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 275-287.
324 Fisherl, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
32
Quotient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https*//www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quotient
[https://perma.cc/E3ZN-V3RV] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
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quotients will be considered. Any question as to the truth of this statement is
resolved by a cursory review of FisherH
The inability of universities to explcitly consider quotas, however, is damaging.
No matter the Court's stance on the matter, strict scrutiny aside, it is simply not
true that racial distinctions are always bad." Indeed, mandating that racial
distinctions are always bad-perpetuating false equivalences between positive and
negative racial distinctions-limits the manner in which universities may use
positive racial preferences to ameliorate the effects of racism, which, stated or not,
is in fact one of the educational benefits of diversity.
Racial diversity on-campus fosters the educational benefits of diversity in
classrooms. 3 u Permitting universities to consider a flexible numerical target for the
admission of minority students, whether that target is met each academic year or
not, would be an enormously effective means of obtaining a diverse student body.
Indeed, there is a plethora of evidence demonstrating that such numeric
calculations are already considered." Such calculus need not deprive candidates of
holistic review.33 And racial quotas have been approved of in other contexts. 331
FisherH gave the Court a platform to expand the means by which a university
might consider numeric data along with race for purposes of college admission.
The Court punted on quotas, but delivered on deference: "Considerable deference
is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, like student body
diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission."3 32 Considering
that universities "serve as 'laboratories for experimentation," it is likely that the
deference provided by the Court will only serve to further mask the legal fiction
that universities do not consider quotients through their affirmative action
programs.3

3

Because in fact, they do. 3 3 4

326 See FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2212 ("In 2002, 52 percent of undergraduate classes with at least five
students had no African-American students enrolled in them, and 27 percent had only one AfricanAmerican student.").
327 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245-46 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas, ever the contrarian, maintains his view that racial distinctions are always
unconstitutional. See FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328 See FisherH, 136 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
329 See, eg., id. at 2212; see also Andrew Lam, White Students' Unfair Advantage in Admissions,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/opinion/white-students-unfairadvantage-in-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/GGM6-JVCK].
" See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 293-94 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
331 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
332 Fisher , 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
33 Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see
also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 See Lam, supra note 329.
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CONCLUSION

Regents of the University of California v Bakke was decided thirty-nine years
ago."' Since then, much has changed, but some things have not. The makeup of
the Supreme Court is completely different and may be even more different by the
time this Note is published."' Nonetheless, for now, race may still be considered in
college admissions, subject to the legal fiction of false equivalences established by
Bakke. And, though recently upheld, the positive consideration of race in college
admissions remains vulnerable to attack. We can thank Bakke for that, too.
Although it is unclear when the next Supreme Court challenge will arise--other
matters are currently at center stage 7-it will come, and scholars, as well as
practitioners, must be prepared. It is hoped that this Note will contribute to that
preparation and encourage the Court to finally recognize the damaging legal
fictions promoted by Bakke and its progeny. If the Supreme Court is serious about
equal justice under law, then the Court must be willing to recognize the potential
power of affirmative action to counteract invidious discrimination. It is time for the
Court to eliminate the harmfid legal fictions enveloping the law of affirmative
action and explicitly provide universities the discretion to use flexible quotients as a
part of a holistic scheme to achieve the educational benefits of diversity on all our
campuses.

See 438 U.S. 265,265 (1978).
" See Jonathan H. Adler, How Scalia-esque Will Donald Trump's Supreme Court Nominee Be?,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh26,
2017),
POST
(Jan.
WASH.
conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/how-scalia-esque-will-donald-trumps-supreme-court-nominee-be
[https-//perma.cc/9639-BYLF]; Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil
Gorsuch
to
the
Supreme
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
31,
2017),
bttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/JL3A-MG8K].
331 See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Trump on Their Side, Conservatives See Hope in Lengthy
Abortion
Fight,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
26
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/politics/democrats-republicans-planned-parenthood.btmi
[https-//perma.cc/B22Z-6599].
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